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Abstract 
This paper describes the outlines of a research program for understanding the cognitive-
emotional brain, with an emphasis on the issue of dynamics: How can we study, characterize, and 
understand the neural underpinnings of cognitive-emotional behaviors as inherently dynamic 
processes? The framework embraces many of the central themes developed by Steve Grossberg 
in his extensive body of work in the past 50 years. By embracing head on the leitmotifs of 
dynamics, decentralized computation, emergence, selection and competition, and autonomy, it 
is proposed that a science of the mind-brain can be developed that is built upon a solid 
foundation of understanding behavior while employing computational and mathematical tools 
in an integral manner. A key implication of the framework is that standard ways of thinking 
about causation are inadequate when unravelling the workings of a complex system such as the 
brain. Instead, it is proposed that researchers should focus on determining the dynamic 
multivariate structure of brain data. Accordingly, central problems become to characterize the 
dimensionality of neural trajectories, and the geometry of the underlying neural space. At a 
time when the development of neurotechniques has reached a fever pitch, neuroscience needs to 
redirect its focus and invest comparable energy in the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of 
its research endeavor. Otherwise we run the risk of being able to measure “every atom” in the 
brain in a theoretical vacuum. 
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1. The problem of emotion, cognition, and behavior 
This paper describes the outlines of a research program for understanding the cognitive-
emotional brain, with an emphasis on dynamics: How can we study, characterize, and 
understand the neural underpinnings of cognitive-emotional behaviors as inherently dynamic 
processes? 
At the outset, I propose eliminating the distinction between emotion and cognition 
(Pessoa, 2018a). What is emotion? What are its defining characteristics? Are emotions distinct 
from feelings? Researchers have debated, and in fact agonized over, such questions for a very 
long time. And the debate continues. For example, nine essays are dedicated to the topic in the 
latest edition of The Nature of Emotion (Fox, Lapate, Davidson, & Shackman, 2018); and 
additional suggestions continue appearing (see, Fox, 2018). Such pursuit of the “essence of 
emotion” appears misguided. What researchers of the mind and brain are interested in, it could 
be argued, is understanding behaviors. Mind scientists seek to understand the structure of 
behaviors, their inherent logic. Brain scientists strive to unravel how the two domains, mental 
and neural, map to one another during behaviors. 
The framework described here is strongly influenced by many lines of research and 
thinking (as any intellectual endeavor, of course), and most of all by the research by Steve 
Grossberg1. 
 
2. Grossbergian themes 
Grossberg has developed his theoretical framework for over 50 years. The breadth of his 
thinking is so enormous as to defy understanding. In this section, I will describe a series of 
themes that permeate his work, sometimes very explicitly, at times less so. Although the 
remainder of the paper will build upon more directly on only a few of the themes – and 
centrally on dynamics – all of them are viewed as essential to building an understanding of the 
cognitive-emotional brain. 
                                                          
1 I was a graduate student at the Department of Cognitive and Neural Systems from 1990 to 1995, and worked closely with Steve during the last 
year of my PhD. This work was continued after I returned to Brazil until 1998. Steve also taught an enormously inspiring informal seminar during 
my second or third year in which he outlined his research program. His infinite energy and untiring guidance have been constant sources of 
inspiration in my career. 
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2.1 Dynamics 
This theme is so central to Grossberg’s work that it is fair to say that without it the work 
would not exist. In Grossberg’s very first publication2, he states: 
Fundamental to the motivation of the new theory is the realization that the dynamics of many psychological 
problems may be viewed from a unified point of view once the geometrical substrates that characterize 
each separate problem are elaborated and distinguished (Grossberg, 1964; italics added). 
The very first equation of his opus (Grossberg, 1964) reads as follows: 
𝑑𝑠𝑘
𝑑𝑡
= 𝛼(𝑀 − 𝑠𝑘)𝑇𝑘 − 𝐷𝑘 , 
where that the “activation” 𝑠𝑘 was defined via a grow process whereby 𝑠𝑘 increased toward 𝑀 
at rate 𝛼 and its total input 𝑇𝑘 (itself dependent on other activations), while also subject to a 
simple exponential decay, 𝐷𝑘. 
At first, it would appear that one would hardly have to emphasize dynamics as an 
important principle. Yet, experimental brain research is frequently, and even preponderantly, 
quasi-static. Data from almost any measurement modality (physiology, functional MRI, etc.) 
are epoched in terms of trials or segments that largely discard most temporal information.  
 
2.2 Behavior 
Consideration of a very extensive body of behavioral data is essential. Contrast this to a sort of 
“tunnel vision” that is unfortunately widespread, as all too often researchers break into cliques 
that focus on apparently distinct sets of phenomena. For example, research addressing 
“appetitive” and “aversive” processing has been carried out by largely separate communities. 
More generally, researchers focus on “motivation” or “emotion,” on “cognition” or “emotion,” 
and so on. But behaviors do not obey boundaries, and thinking about diverse sources of data is 
necessary for deeper understanding. 
                                                          
2 A monograph published while in graduate school with over 400 pages. 
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Behavior is the founding pillar for explaining the brain. This reads like a truism. 
Unfortunately, it is not, as suggested for example by the popularity of the recent paper by 
Krakauer and colleagues (2017) in the powerful journal Neuron (see also Gomez-Marin, 2016; 
Gomez-Marin et al., 2014). Their general call to arms to embrace behavior and eschew a 
neuronal reductionistic bias has resonated with those who believe that ever more sophisticated 
measurement techniques are not enough to dissect the brain. 
What if the activity of every neuron could recorded in the brain of an animal during a 
certain behavior (see Ahrens et al., 2012; Lovett-Barron et al., 2017). What would be gained by 
doing so? Consider a device that can measure the exact state of a modern Airbus 380 aircraft 
(which weighs more than a million pounds), say an image of every atom (aircraft are mostly 
made of aluminum) at millisecond resolution. An adequate level of description of the aircraft 
and its parts is in terms of fluid dynamics and related aerodynamics, where issues related to 
compressible flow, turbulence, and boundary layers are important. Therefore, although it is 
conceivable that this future device could provide some useful information, the point made here 
is that additional data are only minimally useful without more advanced theoretical 
understanding – of both mind (that is behavior) and brain.  
Returning to the theme of dynamics, in parallel with the way data are analyzed, 
behavior is frequently conceptualized in terms of discrete trials of relatively short duration. 
This approach is understandable from the perspective of experimental scientists who need trial 
averaging to handle noise. But behavior itself is inherently temporal, and neglecting that aspect 
seriously limits research progress. 
 
2.3 Decentralization, heterarchy 
Understanding systems in terms of the interactions between their parts fosters a way of thinking 
that favors decentralized organization. It is the coordination between the multiple parts that 
leads to the behaviors of interest, not a “controller” that dictates the function of the system. In 
many sophisticated systems, and the brain is no exception, it is natural to think that many of its 
chief functions depend on centralized processes. For example, the prefrontal cortex may be 
viewed as a uniquely positioned brain sector where multiple types of information converge, 
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allowing it to then guide behavior (Fuster, 2000; Miller and Cohen, 2001). A contrasting view 
is one in which processing takes place in a distributed fashion via the interactions of constituent 
parts. Accordingly, instead of information flowing hierarchically to an “apex region” where all 
the pieces are combined, information flows in multiple directions without a strict hierarchy. An 
organization of this sort is termed a heterarchy to emphasize the notion that the flow of 
information is multidirectional (McCulloch, 1945). 
A vivid illustration of the problem of centralization involves “executive control” 
processes. Early models of executive function were built around the notion of a “controller” – 
essentially a homunculus – that regulates lower-level systems when needed (e.g., Baddeley, 
1996; see Shallice, 1988). The inherent problems with such an approach were eventually 
recognized by several investigators, who called for a “fractionation” of the executive in more 
manageable (that is, less intelligent) units (Monsell and Driver, 2000). Functions such as 
“shifting,” “updating,” and “inhibition” (Miyake et al., 2000) became more prevalent when 
describing the executive. However, time and again the use of such constructs has amounted to a 
way of redescribing the object of study rather than actual explanation. To this day, the goal of 
“banishing the homunculus” remains a formidable challenge (Verbruggen et al., 2014). 
The historical conceptualization of the hypothalamus provides another useful example 
(for an excellent discussion, see Morgane, 1979). This structure is generally referred to as the 
“head ganglion of the autonomic nervous system.” This rubric encapsulates a hierarchical 
theoretical view based on the idea of “descending” control: the area functions as a central 
controller of structures along the extent of the brainstem. Indeed, the hypothalamus has robust 
projections to multiple brainstem sites. However, no area is simply an outflow region (and thus 
a “head”); all areas receive multiple inputs. In the case of the hypothalamus, multiple brainstem 
sites that receive projections from the hypothalamus project back to it, following the general 
tendency of connections to be bidirectional. More critically, the hypothalamus is extensively 
and bidirectionally connected with most sectors of the cortex (Nieuwenhuys, Voogd, and 
Huijzen, 2008; Pessoa, 2017a). Far from a master controller, the hypothalamus is an integral 
node of cortical-subcortical communication. 
 
2.4 Emergence 
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This is a central concept in all of Grossberg’s work, as captured by this recent statement: 
Brain circuits give rise to these distinct psychological functions as emergent properties that arise from 
interactions among brain regions that work together as functional systems. (Grossberg, 2018, p. 2; 
italics in the original). 
Von Bertalanffy (1950, p. 135), one of the chief early proponents of complex systems 
theory, famously asserted “the necessity of investigating not only parts but also relations of 
organization resulting from a dynamic interaction and manifesting themselves by the difference 
in behavior of parts in isolation and in the whole organism”. But what does it mean to say 
“difference in behavior of parts in isolation and in the whole organism”? Hence emergence3, a 
term originally coined in the 1870s to describe instances in chemistry and physiology where 
new and unpredictable properties appear that are not clearly ascribable to the elements from 
which they arise. 
But what does emergence mean? At the most basic level it reflects the notion that 
“something new appears.” While fascinating, this proposition sits uncomfortably with 
experimental scientists. As presciently stated by Von Bertalanffy (1950, p. 142) himself, the 
“exact scientist therefore is inclined to look at these conceptions with justified mistrust.” 
Unfortunately, the picture has not appreciably changed, despite stunning developments in 
mathematics and physics in understanding nonlinear dynamical systems in the last 50 years. 
Today, emergence can be defined precisely, and in ways that leave no room for vague allusions 
to “wholeness” or “system properties.” In the present context, the body of work by Grossberg 
provides a clear demonstration of how “emergent properties” can be precisely defined. 
 
2.5 Selection and competition 
Selection of information for further analysis is a key problem that needs to be solved for 
effective behavior. Indeed: 
                                                          
3 The term emergence appears to have been first proposed in the 1870s when used by George Henry Lewes in his book Problems of Life and Mind 
and taken up by Wilhelm Wundt in his Introduction to Psychology.  
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How can a limited-capacity information processing system that receives a constant stream of diverse 
inputs be designed to selectively process those inputs that are most significant to the objectives of the 
system? (Grossberg and Levine, 1987, p. 5015)  
If selection is the ubiquitous problem that must be effectively solved, competition is the 
mechanism by which stimuli, objects, actions, and so forth are selected. 
 
2.6 Autonomy 
Central to Grossberg’s theoretical framework is the notion of autonomy:  
Brains look the way that they do because they embody computational designs whereby individuals 
autonomously adapt to changing environments in real time. Grossberg (2018, p. 4; italics in the 
original).  
To understand the cognitive-emotional brain, it is necessary to consider that all animals need 
to function independently in diverse and challenging conditions and environments – they need 
to be autonomous. 
All vertebrates have a brain architecture that allows a considerable amount of 
communication and integration of signals (Pessoa, 2018b; Pessoa et al., in preparation). Why 
this kind of architecture? One possibility is that it confers a high degree of flexibility that 
allows animals to cope with the complex interactions in their changing habitats, involving 
predators, prey, potential mates, and so on. Survival may benefit from circuits that can form in 
a combinatorial fashion, as the number of conditions related to the internal and externals worlds 
of the animal are exceedingly high.  
Consider a key system for both appetitive and defensive behaviors, the superior 
colliculus in the midbrain (Dean et al., 1989; Peek & Card, 2016; Pereira & Moita, 2016). It 
receives retinal inputs and has outputs that give it access to movements of head and neck, for 
example. In rodents, the superior colliculus could be involved in implementing the following 
rule: If unexpected movement is overhead, flee; otherwise, if movement is in the lower field, consider 
further exploration. However, simple rules based on stimulus features do not capture the 
flexibility of rodent behavior (think how hard it is to catch a rat! see Dean et al., 1989). In 
particular, rats freeze more frequently to novel stimuli in unfamiliar environments, such as an 
8 
 
open field. Clearly, the context in which a stimulus occurs is essential (Peek & Card, 2016; 
Pereira & Moita, 2016). 
More generally, one way to view the more elaborate architecture of birds and mammals 
(Striedter, 2005) is in terms of the enhanced potential for combinatorial interactions that they 
afford, such that the manner different signals can influence each other is considerably expanded 
– and accordingly expand the range of behaviors. This overall type of architecture may produce 
circuits with local specificity but relatively large-scale sensitivity, a type of global-within-local 
design, which likely contributes to more plastic and sophisticated behaviors. Yet, integration is 
evolutionarily ancient – it is a hallmark of the vertebrate brain – and could explain the 
existence of complex behaviors now recognized in all vertebrate taxa. 
 
2.7 Computational theory 
Brain research is a strongly empirical scientific enterprise. To be sure, research is inspired and 
guided by conceptual/theoretical thinking, although mostly in a qualitative fashion. But as 
Rabinovich and colleagues (2006, p. 48) state: “Neural networks [both natural and artificial] 
are complicated dynamical entities, whose properties are understood only in the simplest cases.” 
Can the complex architecture that supports the cognitive-emotional brain be investigated 
without formal/mathematical tools? Given the richness of the multi-level interactions, does 
neuroscience need to migrate to a model that is closer to that of physics? Experimental 
physicists are not lacking in mathematical sophistication. Neuroscience, in contrast, has evolved 
into extremely sophisticated “laboratory techniques” that are often divorced from formal 
approaches. How should we train future generations of brain scientists? Grossberg’s position 
on these questions is easy to predict, as he and colleagues created the Department of Cognitive 
and Neural Systems at Boston University in 1989 exactly to address this issue. 
 
3. Decentralized computing: Top-down control versus circuit interactions 
The central claim is that, for interesting behaviors, most of the required explaining is not 
present at the level of isolated systems (perception, action, etc.) but at the level of the 
interactions between them (Pessoa, 2018a,b). Strictly speaking, however, the concept of an 
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interaction is not opposed to the notion of separable entities, as interactions can also refer to 
distinct variables, processes, or systems that, themselves, produce effects in a non-additive 
manner. Accordingly, a better term is integration, which implies sufficient intertwining between 
the putatively separate systems that their individuation becomes a linguistic short-cut.  
Let’s consider the mechanisms of fear extinction (Figure 1A). When a conditioned 
stimulus (CS) no longer predicts the unconditioned stimulus (UCS) to which it was paired at 
some point in the past, a new relationship needs to be learned, namely the CS is no longer 
associated with the UCS – this type of learning is called “extinction.” The medial prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) plays an important role during extinction, as initially revealed via lesioning 
(Morgan et al., 1993) and subsequently by chemical manipulation of this area (for review, see 
Dunsmoor et al., 2015). As the medial PFC is extensively interconnected with the amygdala, an 
early idea was that the former would exert an inhibitory influence on the latter, thereby 
enabling the extinction of the conditioned response. At this level of description, fear extinction 
fits the scheme of separate entities interacting to generate a new behavior: cognition (tied to the 
medial PFC) controlling emotion (tied to the amygdala) in a top-down fashion.  
Yet, considering the PFC as “top” 
and the amygdala as “down” does not 
take into account the richness of the 
existing neuronal interactions. It is well 
known that the amygdala plays a critical 
role in aversive learning, that is, the 
initial CS-UCS learning. The amygdala 
plays a critical role in the acquisition and 
consolidation of fear extinction, too. 
Chemical blockage of amygdala 
mechanisms (in the basolateral 
amygdala) either impair or entirely 
prevent the acquisition of extinction (Herry et al., 2006). In addition, consolidation of 
extinction is supported by morphological changes in amygdala synapses (in the basolateral 
amygdala; see Tovote et al., 2015). These findings, together with the existence of amygdala 
pathways to the medial PFC, has led some investigators to suggest that the amygdala actually 
 
Figure 1. Fear extinction and structure-function mapping. (A) 
Fear extinction. (B) Conceptualization of fear extinction in terms 
of the top-down regulation of the amygdala by the medial 
prefrontal cortex, with additional variables influencing the 
process. (C) Schematic representation of the connections 
between some of the brain regions involved, emphasizing a 
non-hierarchical view of the processes leading to fear 
extinction. The descriptors “valence,” “regulation,” and so on, 
are not tied to brain areas in any straightforward one-to-one 
fashion. Abbreviations: CS, conditioned stimulus; MPFC, medial 
prefrontal cortex; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex. 
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should be viewed as the “top” region in the relationship with the medial PFC (Herry et al., 
2008; see also Do-Monte et al., 2015). In fact, multiple cell groups in the amygdala project to 
the medial PFC, whose outputs in turn influence amygdala signals. 
The extinction of conditioned responses is one of the oldest and most widely known 
findings from psychological science (Dunsmoor et al., 2015). Despite this long history, recent 
research has greatly expanded our knowledge about this phenomenon, revealing that 
extinction, far from a simple inhibitory process, is an extremely nuanced learning process. 
Extinction is now understood to be a form of learning (of the new relationship between the CS 
and UCS) that itself involves acquisition, retrieval, and consolidation. In other words, it is not a 
simple inhibitory mechanism of the “fear response” but a sophisticated form of learning. In 
particular, following extinction, contextual information plays a critical role in determining 
whether the original fear memory or the new “extinction memory” controls behavior – should 
the animal fear or not the CS? Accordingly, an elaborate set of neural interactions is needed to 
support such context sensitivity. 
When the CS no longer predicts an aversive outcome, it behooves the animal to take 
into account that information, such that features of the new environment are learned so as to 
predict safety. The hippocampus plays a key role in establishing context dependence during 
extinction learning. There are at least two anatomical routes by which the hippocampus 
contributes to these processes (Herry et al., 2008; Maren et al., 2013). The first involves direct 
projections from the hippocampus to the amygdala; the hippocampus is part of a circuit that 
involves amygdala neurons that are engaged when the behavioral context is different from the 
extinction context (this pathway thus promotes fear). The second, indirect contribution 
involves dense projections to the medial prefrontal cortex, which appearss to participate in a 
circuit with the amygdala that indicates safety (this pathway is linked to extinction behaviors). 
Another region in the circuit determining if fear should be switched on or off is the 
thalamus, which is a major player in the processing of biologically significant stimuli (Heimer 
et al., 2017), as well as a key subcortical–cortical connectivity hub (Pessoa, 2017b). In the past 
few years, the paraventricular nucleus of the thalamus (PVT) has been established as a thalamic 
node that interacts with cortico-amygdala circuits for the establishment, retrieval, and 
maintenance of long-term fear memories (Do-Monte et al., 2015; Penzo et al., 2015). Neurons 
in the PVT are robustly activated by behaviorally relevant events, including novel 
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(“unfamiliar”) stimuli, as well as reinforcing stimuli and their predicting cues (Ren et al., 2018). 
Notably, PVT responses are influenced by changes in homeostatic state and behavioral context, 
and inhibition of the PVT suppresses appetitive and aversive learning (Ren et al., 2018). Given 
that the PVT is bidirectionally connected with the medial PFC, and projects throughout the 
extended amygdala (central amygdala plus bed nucleus of the stria terminalis), this region is 
well placed to further refine processing during behavioral conditions eliciting fear extinction. 
More generally, during fear extinction – and, in fact, fear acquisition and expression – 
signals from the amygdala, medial PFC, hippocampus, thalamus, among others, collectively 
determine behavioral responses. These multi-region interactions afford greater behavioral 
malleability when responding to threat. A more standard approach to attempting to explain 
fear extinction would be to label each brain region in the following manner, for example: 
amygdala-valence, medial PFC-regulation, hippocampus-context, thalamus-biological 
significance, and so on. One could then describe observed behaviors in terms of “standard 
interactions” (that is, those involving separate entities) between the putative processes (valence, 
regulation, etc.) (Figure 1B). But if these processes are not separable, they do not encode stable 
variables that are simply modulated by other variables. In the end, explanations in terms of 
standard interactions will be found wanting – integration is needed (Figure 1C). 
 
4. Causation in complex systems 
A potentially unappealing aspect of the discussion and conclusion above is that causation is 
muddied – what causes what during extinction? Dissecting phenomena in terms of their 
component parts seems like an unimpeachable methodology, to the extent that it can be viewed 
as almost an axiom of modern science (Deacon, 2011). At the broadest level, the issues at hand 
speak to how we should study systems as complex as minds and brains.  
Understanding causation has always been at the core of the scientific enterprise. To a 
great extent, the mission of neuroscience is to uncover the nature of the signals observed in 
different parts of the brain, and to attempt to disentangle the potential contributions to those 
signals. Consider a type of reasoning prevalent in neuroscience, what can be called the billiard 
ball model of causation. In this Newtonian model, force applied to a ball leads to its movement 
on the table until it hits the target ball (Pessoa, 2017c, 2018c). The reason the target ball moves 
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is obvious; the first ball hits it, and via the force applied to it, it moves. Translated into neural 
jargon, we can rephrase as follows: a signal external to a brain region excites neurons in that 
region, which excite or inhibit neurons in another brain region given anatomical pathways 
connecting them. But this general mode of thinking, which has been very productive in the 
history of science, is too impoverished when complex systems – the brain for one – are 
considered. 
Mannino and Bressler (2015) highlight two features of the brain that are problematic 
for standard (Newtonian) causation. First, anatomical connections are frequently bidirectional, 
leading to bidirectional physiological influences. But if one element causally influences another 
while the second simultaneously causally influences the first, sometimes called mutual causality 
(Frankel, 1986), the concept breaks down. Second, convergence of anatomical projections implies 
that multiple regions concurrently influence a single receiving node, making the attribution of 
unitary causal influences problematic. 
Along these lines, in a recent paper I outlined several principles of brain organization 
that impact the understanding of causality (Pessoa 2017b; see also Pessoa, 2014): 1) massive 
combinatorial anatomical connectivity; 2) extensive cortical-subcortical anatomical 
connectional systems; 3) high distributed functional connectivity4; 4) overlapping large-scale 
functional brain networks; and 5) dynamic large-scale functional brain networks. Taken 
together, the brain basis of emotion-cognition involves distributed, large-scale cortical-
subcortical networks. The high degree of signal distribution and integration provides a nexus 
for the intermixing of information related to perception, cognition, emotion, motivation, and 
action. Importantly, the functional architecture consists of multiple overlapping networks that 
are highly dynamic and context-sensitive, such that how a given brain region affiliates with a 
specific network shifts as a function of task demands and brain state (Najafi et al., 2017. In all, 
particular cognitive-emotional behaviors can be understood in terms of dynamic functionally 
integrated systems, such as the one involving the amygdala and its cortical-subcortical circuits 
(Pessoa, 2017b). 
                                                          
4 Functional connectivity refers to the degree of association between time series data of two brain regions, irrespective of their anatomical 
connectivity status (whether directly connected or not). It is typically estimated based on Pearson’s correlation coefficient, although multiple 
measures of association have been proposed (for example, mutual information). 
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The upshot is that Newtonian causality provides an extremely poor candidate for 
explanation in non-isolable systems like the brain. The shift advocated here is to move away 
from individual entities (like billiard balls) and consider the temporal evolution of “multi-
particle systems.” An example is provided by considering another analogy from physics: the 
motion of celestial bodies in a gravitational field. 
Physicists and mathematicians have been 
interested in the problem of stability for centuries, and 
this was a central problem in Newtonian (that is, non-
relativistic) celestial mechanics. For example, what 
types of trajectories do two bodies, such as the earth 
and the sun, exhibit? The so-called two-body problem 
was completely solved by Johann Bernoulli in 1734. 
For more than two bodies (for example, the moon, the 
earth, and the sun), the problem has vexed 
mathematicians for centuries. Although the three-body 
problem cannot be solved in the same sense as the two-
body problem, topological properties can be used to 
classify families of three-body periodic orbits. Figure 2 
displays the “yin-yan II” class first reported by 
Suvakov and Dmitrasinovic (2013) in a breakthrough study describing a large number of new 
orbit families. 
This gravitational three-body problem illustrates the approach to studying complex 
systems described here: determining and characterizing the temporal evolution of multi-
particle systems. The idea will be further developed below after a brief comment on the use of 
advanced neurotechniques to study causation in neural systems. 
  
4.1 Optogenetic causation 
In neuroscience, causal efficacy – that is, causal intervention – has become the field’s gold 
standard, and is implicitly or explicitly equated with understanding. Technologies such as 
optogenetics exist that make it possible to manipulate neural circuits directly and more 
Figure 2. The three-body problem in 
Newtonian gravitation. As the problem does 
not admit to a general mathematical solution, 
researchers have sought to characterize 
families of periodic orbits. The figure displays 
the “yin-yan II” family in two dimensions. The 
three circles represent the three bodies. 
Reproduced from Li and Liao (2017). Dynamic 
plots can be found at 
http://numericaltank.sjtu.edu.cn/three-body/three-body.htm. 
14 
 
precisely. However, causal-mechanistic explanations, while valuable, are qualitatively different 
from understanding how circuit elements combine to produce behavior (for recent discussions, 
see Krakauer et al., 2017; Fregnac, 2017). 
Consider the following admittedly crude example. Suppose an alien species is studying 
how our automobiles work by using an advanced form of technology. Unbeknownst to us, they 
are able to measure and manipulate our cars while we drive. Suppose they are able to pull the 
throttle wire linked to the gas pedal, thereby accelerating a car. By doing so enough times, they 
establish a causal link between the throttle wire and the car’s speed (and publish their results in 
one of their top journals). Obviously, although they can now deduce that the gas pedal plays an 
important role in the car’s movement, their understanding of automobile function is increased 
only minimally. For one, they have no idea that the system controls air inflow and therefore 
controls fuel injection into the engine5; not to mention the principles of the combustion engine.  
Now, consider the following study, where optogenetic stimulation was used to activate 
neurons in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain of mice (Pascoli et al., 2018). As in 
the classic self-stimulation study by Olds and Milner (1954), mice learned to press a lever, in 
this case for optogenetic-driven enhancement of VTA activity. After two weeks of training, 
upon lever pressing, mice now received a brief electric shock in addition to increased VTA 
activation. Approximately 60% of the mice persisted in lever pressing impulsively, despite 
being administered the shock. In addition, the authors found that a pathway from the 
orbitofrontal cortex to the dorsal striatum (in the forebrain) affected the behavior of the mice; 
for example, optogenetic inhibition of the pathway made them stop lever pressing. Compulsive 
behavior (lever pressing) could be suppressed or induced by decreasing or increasing, 
respectively, the strength of this neural connection. Remarkable as these results may be (they 
were published in Nature as a full-length article), how much closer are we to understanding 
“compulsive behaviors?” For one, the VTA neurons stimulated by lever pressing do not 
connect directly with either the orbitofrontal cortex or the dorsal striatum. Clearly, a 
multisynaptic circuit involving the regions studied must be involved (Keiflin and Janak, 2015), 
and the mechanisms of action remain unknown. The discovery of the simple causal link 
between the orbitofrontal cortex and the dorsal striatum via sophisticated techniques, 
intriguing as it is, leads to an ostensible shift of the goalpost but leaves us minimally closer to 
                                                          
5 It is assumed that an older car is being studied, and not a newer drive-by-wire model. 
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understanding the circuit. The objective here was not to critique this particular study, but 
instead to highlight shortcomings of the causal-mechanistic, interventionist approach currently 
widespread in neuroscience (see also Krakauer et al., 2017). 
 
5. Transient brain dynamics 
The upshot is that simple ways of reasoning about causation are inadequate when unravelling 
the workings of a complex system such as the brain. Instead of focusing on causation as the 
inherent goal of explanations in neuroscience, a fruitful research avenue is to develop formal 
tools that describe the dynamic multivariate structure of brain data. In other words, one is 
interested in describing the joint state of a set of brain regions, and how this joint state evolves 
temporally. A major goal is then to work out how groups of regions dynamically coalesce into 
coherent functional units and how they dissolve when their assembly is no longer needed to 
meet processing demands.  
Consider a system of neurons, neuronal populations, or brain regions, which is 
characterized by their activation strengths as a function of time: 𝑥1(𝑡), 𝑥2(𝑡), ⋯ , 𝑥𝑛(𝑡). The 
vector 𝒙 describes the current joint state of the system (when evaluated at a given time, t), and 
𝒙(𝑡) describes how this joint state evolves through time. A popular approach to thinking about 
brain dynamics was based on the notion of steady-state attractors, in which activity levels 
would converge to equilibrium (for at least some period of time). For example, when started at 
state 𝒙𝐼, the system would evolve temporally and settle in state 𝒙𝐴, where 𝒙𝐴 is the stable state 
closest to 𝒙𝐼 (Cohen and Grossberg, 1983; see also Hopfield, 1982, 1984). In such networks, an 
input pattern will cause activity changes until it settles into one pattern, the so-called attractor 
state (here, 𝒙𝐴). We can thus say that the input is associated with the properties of the entire, 
and specific, attractor state, which can be viewed as its representation. However, the type of 
dynamics in “attractor networks” is limited in the sense that the key element is the state into 
which the network settles (which can be represented formally by, for example, a minimum in an 
energy function). Importantly, the path taken to reach the attractor state does not matter. 
The idea of “computing with attractors” should be contrasted with the one of computing 
with transient dynamics (Rabinovich et al., 2008; Buonomano and Maas, 2009).  Transient 
dynamics do not require waiting for the system to reach equilibrium, and the succession of 
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states visited by the system provide the representation for the event in question. The temporal 
window considered is arbitrary; for example, 300 ms after an input stimulus, 500 ms prior to 
movement initiation, or 20 seconds during a mental event. Figure 3A illustrates the idea in the 
context of recordings from neurons in the antennal lobe of the locust (Broome et al., 2006), 
showing the succession of states associated with the presentation of two distinct odors when 
projected onto a lower-dimensional three-dimensional space (those less familiar with this type 
of plot may benefit from Figure 4A-B). The 
original measurements were performed in 87 
neurons, and the projection here is simply for 
illustrative purposes (we will discuss the issue 
of dimensionality further below). Whereas the 
trajectories might come arbitrarily close at 
several time points6, the entire trajectory 
provides a potentially unique signature for the 
task in question, such that the transients are 
input specific, and contain information about 
what initiated them. Furthermore, the 
trajectories are assumed to be stable. Thus, they 
are resistant to noise in that they are reliable to 
relatively small variations in initial conditions. 
Thinking in terms of trajectories moves the emphasis away from a strictly causal 
interpretation. Instead of, for example, statements such as “𝑥1(𝑡) causes 𝑥2(𝑡 + 1),” the 
framework encourages a description that summarizes the temporal evolution of the system of 
interest. Experimentally, a central goal then becomes estimating trajectories robustly from 
available data. At this point, computational models can be tested against the data, or possibly 
developed to explain the data. In other words, what kind of system, and what kind of 
interactions between system elements – what mechanisms – generate similar trajectories, given 
similar inputs and conditions? 
                                                          
6 The issue of the proximity of trajectories will depend on the dimensionality of the system in question (which is usually unknown) and the 
dimensionality of the space where data are being considered (say, after dimensionality reduction). Naturally, points projected onto a lower-
dimensional representation might be closer than in the original higher-dimensional space. 
 
Figure 3. Neural trajectories. Trajectories represent the 
activation state of the system at every point in time. (A) 
Recordings were performed in 87 principal neurons (PNs) of the 
antennal lobe of the locust during exposure to two odors (citral: 
cit; geraniol: ger) (Broome et al., 2006). Local linear embedding 
(LLE) was employed to reduce the dimensionality of the data. 
(B) Recordings were performed in premotor and motor cortex 
during reaching movements in the macaque monkey 
(Churchland et al., 2012). A principal components analysis-
based algorithm was used to determine the two-dimensional 
representation displayed. Individual trials are represented by 
trajectories colored based on the extent of preparatory/pre-
movement activity (from red to green). 
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5.1 Trajectories during threat processing 
Consider a functional MRI 
participant experiencing 
alternating “safe” and 
“threat” blocks, where they 
lie passively in the former, 
while they may experience 
mild shocks during the 
latter. At the onset of threat 
blocks, brain regions of the 
so-called salience network 
(including the anterior 
insula and medial PFC) 
would be expected to 
respond vigorously 
compared to the period prior 
to the block transition 
(Menon and Uddin, 2010). 
Regions of the salience 
network would also respond 
to the onset of the “safe” 
block, but suppose that these 
responses are less vigorous 
than during the transition to threat. In terms of evoked responses, this scenario can be 
illustrated as in Figure 4A. For two hypothetical regions, if we diagram the temporal evolution 
of the responses during the block transitions, the trajectories for the two conditions can be 
illustrated as in Figure 4B; the state-space plot describes the activity levels (𝑥1(𝑡), 𝑥2(𝑡)). Now, 
suppose that a group of high-anxious individuals is investigated and that they partially 
generalize the aversiveness experienced during threat blocks to safe ones; that is, they treat 
 
Figure 4. Neural trajectories during threat processing. (A) Evoked responses when 
transitioning from safe (green) to threat (red), and vice versa. 𝑥1and 𝑥2 represent 
the activity of two brain regions. (B) The responses can be jointly plotted as a 
function of time, (𝑥1(𝑡), 𝑥2(𝑡)), to show safe and threat trajectories. The two 
dots in panel A correspond to the ones here (schematically only). (C) Trajectories 
for safe and threat conditions when evokes responses are comparable but they 
are more correlated during threat. (D) Corresponding to panel D, we can think of 
the trajectories for threat and safe as evolving through cylinders of different 
diameters (which correspond to the trajectory variance). (E) Individual 
differences in anxiety can be understood as shifting the trajectories from safe to 
threat. 
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every block onset as a potential transition into a threat condition.7 In this case, the trajectory 
observed during safe periods would look more like threat trajectories, and the more so for 
individuals with higher levels of anxiety (Figure 4E). 
In an actual functional MRI study that we performed (McMenamin et al., 2014), we 
found that, somewhat surprisingly, responses evoked when transitioning into safe and threat 
blocks were rather comparable in magnitude. Presumably, both safe and threat blocks were 
motivationally significant, thus evoking similar salience-related responses; perhaps, in the 
context of encountering threat periods, safe periods are quite noteworthy. However, although 
evoked responses were comparable, signals were more cohesive during threat relative to safe; 
that is, transitions to threat blocks were associated with evoked responses that were more 
correlated (for a given pair of regions in the salience network). The respective trajectories for 
our experiment thus can be illustrated as in Figure 4C (the trajectory linked to threat stays 
closer to the diagonal (𝑥1 = 𝑥2) than the one linked to safe). And if we consider multiple trials, 
the trajectories during threat will remain in a part of the space closer to the diagonal (Figure 
4D). 
 
6. Dimensionality reduction of neural measurements 
Neuronal data are inherently high dimensional. Consider, for example, the simultaneous 
recordings across 10-102 locations in electrophysiological grids, 102 sensors with MEG/EEG, 
102-103 neurons with calcium imaging, or the 104-105 spatial locations with functional MRI. Is 
it possible that the information across, say, hundreds of measurements could be captured in 
fewer dimensions without substantial loss of information? Of course, techniques such as 
principal components analysis are commonplace in data analysis (and can be used, for example, 
for noise reduction). However, aside from practical concerns, understanding the dimensionality 
of the data is also important conceptually. For example, it may help uncover relationships that 
are not apparent in higher dimensions, thus helping to elucidate the mapping from structure to 
function. In particular, a parsimonious description of the data may uncover stronger 
relationships with experimentally manipulated variables or other behaviorally relevant 
variables (see also Santhanam et al., 2009). In addition, the number of dimensions of a 
                                                          
7 High-anxious individuals generalize conditions associated with conditioned fear, for example (see Lissek et al., 2008). 
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dynamical system is an enormously important topic in mathematics (Packard et al., 1980; 
Takens, 1981; Sauer et al., 1991). 
One of the most studied systems in terms of temporal trajectories involves odor 
processing in invertebrates. In the locust, odors generate distributed responses across the 
antennal lobe, and such responses evolve in an odor-specific manner (Broome et al., 2006). In 
Figure 3A, the lower-dimensional representation was obtained by nonlinear dimensionality 
reduction (Roweis and Saul, 2000). While the dimensionality reduction technique applied was 
somewhat arbitrary, it helped the investigators gain insight into the following theoretical 
question: what happens when one odor is being experienced and a second one is presented? One 
possibility is that the system would “reset,” namely responses would return to baseline, then 
start to evolve in the direction of the new odor (Broome et al., 2006). An alternative possibility 
would be for the first trajectory (the one associated with the first odor) to deviate from its 
ongoing evolution and progress along a path corresponding to the mixture of the two odors. 
Based on the trajectories observed under these experimental conditions, Broome and colleagues 
were able to rule out the first possibility, while obtaining some support for the second. 
Together, dimensionality reduction helped uncover mechanisms that would be potentially hard 
to derive in higher dimensions. 
Neuronal dynamics has been investigated in nonhuman primates, too. In one study, 
Churchland and colleagues (2012) recorded responses in motor and premotor cortex as 
monkeys performed reaching movements. Data from 50-200 recordings were projected onto 
two dimensions, revealing a rotational structure to neural trajectories (Figure 3B). Their 
analysis uncovered processes at the level of the population of neurons, according to which 
preparatory activity (that is, prior to movement initiation) sets the initial state of a dynamical 
process that unfolds during movement execution. More generally, the authors proposed that 
motor cortex expresses a dynamical system that generates and controls movements, and that 
can be expressed as 
𝑑𝒓
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓(𝒓(𝑡)) + 𝒖(𝑡) 
where r is a vector describing the firing rate of all neurons (the population response or neural 
state), 𝑓 is an unknown function, and u is an external input. As in the example of the locust 
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data, dimensionality reduction helped unearth processes that would not have been evident in 
higher dimensions. 
 
7 Geometry of the underlying neural space  
If a neural dataset is acquired in a high-dimensional space and subsequently reduced to a lower 
dimensionality, what should be the geometry of this space? For simplicity, the original high-
dimensional space is frequently, if implicitly, considered Euclidean. But given that not all 
information can be preserved in fewer dimensions, the question of the nature of the lower 
dimensionality comes to the fore. For example, in the case of the locust data, a local linear 
embedding algorithm was employed that attempts to capture information about global 
geometry in fewer dimensions (by collectively analyzing overlapping local neighborhoods; 
Roweis and Saul, 2000). In the case of the monkey data, a PCA-based method was applied. 
We could follow a similar approach 
with the functional MRI data of safe and 
threat periods discussed in Section 5.1 
(McMenamin et al., 2014). The study 
considered 51 brain regions of the so-called 
salience, executive, and task-negative (also 
called “default”) networks, in addition to the 
amygdala and the bed nucleus of the stria 
terminalis (the latter two are particularly 
important during threat-related processing). 
We performed dimensionality reduction with 
the local linear embedding algorithm (Roweis 
and Saul, 2000) and plotted the mean 
trajectories for the two conditions, together 
with an indication of their variance (Figure 5). 
The two trajectories initially overlap but are 
quite distinct overall. 
 
Figure 5. Temporal trajectories based on functional MRI 
data. The original data were from safe and threat periods 
in the study by McMenamin et al. (2014). Trajectories for 
safe and threat conditions are fairly distinct in the lower-
dimensional space determined by local linear embedding. 
(A) Mean trajectories across individuals. The colored circles 
indicate the starting point. (B) Surfaces provide an 
indication of the underlying space of trajectories, or 
manifold, and were created by considering the variance of 
the trajectories across individuals. 
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More generally, the geometry of the underlying neural space will depend on a 
combination of the properties of the data and the task condition of interest. We propose the 
following neural-dynamics space hypothesis: behaviors can be described via (they are associated 
with) classes of trajectories within specific neural spaces (see also Gao et al., 2017). Consider 
the example of the citral-related trajectory in the locust antennal lobe (Figure 3A). Multiple 
instances of experiencing this odor are proposed to reside within the surface schematically 
represented in Figure 6A. This surface defines the space within which trajectories linked with 
this odor naturally evolve. Such surfaces, which are mathematically called manifolds, thus serve 
as representations of the stimuli, tasks, or conditions in question. 
The examples so far assumed the 
use of an explicit method of 
dimensionality reduction (the simplest of 
which is perhaps PCA), a data-driven 
approach that is suitable in many 
circumstances. However, knowledge of 
the problem domain can guide this 
process, too. In fact, in the case of the 
Churchland et al. (2012) study, the PCA-
based method the authors used was 
developed to extract rotational 
information because the authors believed 
that such coordinate system would be 
relevant to understanding the topology of 
neural trajectories in motor cortex during 
reaching movements8. To illustrate the 
use of domain knowledge, consider a 
hypothetical study that records multiple 
cells in each of three distinct brain areas, and suppose that different properties are thought to 
                                                          
8 The rotational structure was not due to primary features of neuronal responses, such as tuning to reach direction (Elsayed and Cunningham, 
2017). 
 
Figure 6. Trajectory manifolds. A manifold is a surface (more 
precisely a topological space) that near each point (that is, locally) 
resembles Euclidean space (circles and spheres are some of the 
simplest manifolds in two- and three dimensions). A non-Euclidean 
(Riemannian) metric on a manifold allows distances and angles to be 
measured. (A) Example manifold. The neural-dynamics space working 
hypothesis suggests that system behaviors can be characterized via 
classes of trajectories within neural spaces with particular geometry 
– that is, manifolds. (B, C) Neural manifolds associated with transient 
dynamics are, by definition, non-periodic. Here, “population” 
indicates that the manifold is a group-level property. Two inter-
related problems can be posed. One is estimating the group-level 
trajectory (red) from sample data (trajectories in orange); the other 
is learning the population manifold (green) from sample-level 
trajectories (orange). 
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be important for their function. In this case, one can plot the dynamics of the system in terms of 
these properties (Figure 7). 
In our study of safe and threat periods discussed above (McMenamin et al., 2014), we 
found that a network-level graph-theory measure called global efficiency captured a relevant 
facet of threat processing. Briefly, efficiency provides a measures of how effectively a network 
exchanges information 
(Latora and Marchiori, 
2001). In particular, 
small-world networks 
are systems that are 
both locally and 
globally efficient. 
Another graph-theory 
property of interest in 
our study was node 
centrality. Increased centrality indicates that a node participates more heavily in the interactions 
between other nodes – that is, they become more of a hub. And, as discussed previously, 
motivationally significant events, such as blocks transitions, produced stronger responses in 
regions of the salience network. Accordingly, it could prove informative to project the 
evolution of the system along these three axes.  
Let’s apply this idea in the case of a different experimental paradigm. Consider a 
scenario in which threat is manipulated dynamically. For example, two circles move on the 
screen in a quasi-random manner and, if they collide, a mild electrical shock is administered to 
the participant (Myer et al., 2019). Thus, there will be periods of increased anxious anticipation 
(circles approaching each other) and periods of relative safety (circles retreating from each 
other). Figure 8 illustrates hypothetical trajectories during approach and retreat in terms of the 
three dimensions discussed. The overall framework is also fruitful to describe trait- or 
temperament-like phenotypes. For example, if Figure 8 portrays the situation for a group of 
low-anxious individuals, for high-anxious individuals one could hypothesize that (i) periods of 
approach would be associated with higher activation of salience-network regions, (ii) higher 
network efficiency, and (iii) increased centrality of regions such as the bed nucleus of the stria 
 
Figure 7. Geometry of the neural space. The activity of brain areas 1-3 can be mapped 
onto distinct properties believed to reflect their function, including univariate 
properties and multivariate/network-level properties. Here, a hypothetical trajectory is 
illustrated during a dynamic threat scenario in which threat level gradually increases 
(red) and then decreases (green). 
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terminalis and amygdala. Importantly, these properties evolve temporally, as observed 
experimentally (McMenamin et al., 2014; Najafi et al., 2017; see also Pessoa and McMenamin, 
2017). 
Dispositional negativity refers to a 
fundamental dimension of childhood temperament 
and adult personality and constitutes a prominent 
risk factor for the development of pediatric and 
adult anxiety disorders (Hur et al., 2018). 
Behaviorally, dispositional negativity is associated 
with threat-related attentional bias and deficits in 
executive control. Key brain systems proposed to 
underpin dispositional negativity include the 
amygdala, as well as the frontoparietal and cingulo-
opercular networks (Hur et al., 2018). 
One could further test these ideas by 
investigating experimental conditions involving 
the performance of cognitively demanding tasks 
during the presence of threat. In particular, imagine 
that during the execution of an executive task the threat level is increased from low to high. In 
terms of neural trajectories, one could hypothesize that there would be a shift in the state-space 
region occupied by the conditions at hand (Figure 9). In addition, for individuals with higher 
dispositional negativity two predictions could be made: (i) the transition from one region to 
another would take place faster; and (ii) the extent of the change would be greater (that is, the 
two regions would be farther apart). Irrespective of the potential of these particular predictions 
to advance the understanding of dispositional negativity, they illustrate how hypotheses can be 
formulated and tested according to the present ideas. Finally, it also encourages a move away 
from amygdala-centric proposals that dominate the literature. 
 
8 Causation in complex systems, again 
Figure 8. Trajectories during threat processing. 
Threat-level varies dynamically and increases 
(approach) and decreases (retreat). The temporal 
evolution of the system can be described in terms 
of the global efficiency of the salience network, the 
activation (evoked responses) in the same 
network, as well as the centrality of the 
amygdala/bed nucleus of the stria terminalis 
regions. 
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In many systems, the relationships 
between entity-level variables cannot be 
studied independently of the overall 
system state. Deyle and Sugihara (2011; 
see references therein) proposed that 
such emergence-level view may help 
explain why many natural systems are 
so difficult to understand and predict. 
Building on the mathematical work by 
Takens (1981) and others, Sugihara et 
al. (2012) describe a powerful 
conceptualization that can be called 
dynamical systems causation: two variables 
are causally linked if they participate in the same dynamical system. In other words, the two 
variables share a common attractor manifold, such that each variable can identify the state of 
the other (for example, in the Lorenz attractor). Importantly, this notion can be formally and 
quantitatively developed (see their convergent cross mapping method). What is more, the 
proposal is general enough to encompass more traditional views, while also capturing the 
relationship between variables in many complex systems.    
The notion of dynamical systems causation is potentially powerful, but it relies on 
asymptotic behaviors of the systems in question (such as the attractor manifold). We have 
emphasized, instead, thinking in terms of transient dynamics, and neural events far from 
equilibrium and long-term properties. Whereas, conceptually, this does not present a 
significant impediment, in practice reliably estimating interdependencies may be data-limited. 
Indeed, these issues have been noted and related methods proposed to ameliorate the problem 
(Ye and Sugihara, 2016). Furthermore, the problem may be more tractable with group studies 
in which data from multiple participants is used to recover the underlying manifold. More 
generally, in group studies, the problem may be posed in terms of estimating a population 
manifold from individual-level trajectories (Figure 6B-C).  
Nevertheless, instead of adopting a single definition/measure of causation, at the 
current stage of scientific development, it would be beneficial to encourage a plurality of 
 
Figure 9. Dispositional negativity. Participants perform a cognitive 
challenging task for an extended period of time. In one condition, 
there is a lower level of background threat, whereas a higher level 
is present in the second; the latter is anticipated to impair 
performance to a greater extent. Hypothetical neural trajectories 
are shown for the two conditions: the two trajectories will reside 
in separate sectors of state space, with the separation between 
them depending on an individual’s level of dispositional 
negativity. 
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conceptualizations, not least because elucidating complex systems will benefit from multiple 
vantage points. For example, Mannino and Bressler (2015) propose the notion of probabilistic 
causation: an event does not necessarily determine another event, but rather changes its 
probability of occurrence. As they state: “A causes B” may be defined as the probability of B 
given A is greater than the probability of B given that A does not occur: P(B|A) > P(B|~A). 
Their framework is enmeshed with establishing the “ultimate nature” of the brain, namely is it 
a deterministic or a probabilistic system? Irrespective of this more controversial question, their 
proposal offers an important way to move beyond outdated models of causes. 
It is worth pointing out that the popular framework of sydying causality introduced by 
Granger (1969) comes with serious limitations (as recognized by Granger himself). In today’s 
terminology, variable x “Granger causes” y if the predictability of y declines when x is removed 
from the universe of all possible causative variables. However, a key requirement of the model 
is that of separability, such as observed in linear systems. Thus, information about a causative 
factor needs to be unique to that variable. In coupled systems like the brain, such assumption is 
clearly violated. 
Overall, the suggestion to embrace multiple conceptualizations of causality reflects the 
idea that the problem is dauntingly challenging. In this regard, it is just the opposite of what 
was asserted recently by Mehler and Kording (2018): “causality has a perfectly clean 
definition.” Finally, no treatment of causality is probably comprehensive without considering 
the work of Pearl (2009). 
 
9. Learning dynamics with reservoir computing 
Temporal trajectories potentially provide signatures for tasks, conditions, or states. 
Dimensionality reduction provides a strategy to potentially identify trajectories in lower-
dimensional spaces. But can trajectories be learned from neural data? In this section, we 
describe an approach to learning temporal information that we recently developed in the 
context of functional MRI data (Venkatesh et al., 2019).  
Naturally, when considering the temporal information present in functional MRI data, 
it is necessary to consider the slow evolution of blood oxygenation responses. Accordingly, 
dynamics should be understood at a commensurate temporal scale – on the order of a few 
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seconds or typically longer. Fortunately, many mental processes unfold at such time scales, 
such as the processing of event boundaries (Zacks et al., 2001), a gradually approaching 
threatening stimulus (Najafi et al., 2017), listening to a narrative (Ferstl et al., 2005), or 
watching a movie (Hasson et al., 2004). 
Several machine learning techniques exist that are sensitive to temporal information. 
Among them, recurrent neural networks (RNNs) have attracted considerable attention 
(Williams and Zipser, 1989; Pearlmutter, 1989; Horne and Giles, 1995). However, effectively 
training RNNs can be challenging, particularly without large amounts of data (Pascanu et al., 
2013); but for recent developments see (Martens and Sutskever, 2011; Graves et al., 2013). In 
our study (Venkatesh et al., 2019), we proposed to use reservoir computing to study temporal 
properties of brain data. This class of algorithms, which includes liquid-state machines (Maass 
Figure 10. Reservoir computing and dimensionality reduction. (A) Brain data are provided to a three-layer neural 
network. The input layer registers activation at time t across a set of regions of interest. The reservoir layer contains 
units with random connections, and provides a memory mechanism such that activation at time t is influenced by past 
time points. The readout (output) layer indicates the category of the input, such as the binary labels “0” or “1” 
corresponding to task condition. Only the connections between the reservoir and the readout layer (shown in orange) 
are adaptable. (B) The first step of dimensionality reduction employed principal components analysis of the reservoir 
states. Subsequently, the dimensions were ordered based on classification information (such as the weights of a logistic 
regression classifier). If the top three dimensions are selected, the evolution of the reservoir can be plotted in this 
lower-dimensional space. In the present case, the trajectories originated from functional MRI data during the viewing 
of short movie clips, which were either “scary” or “funny” (Venkatesh et al., 2019). In the example, the trajectories 
separated quite well. 
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et al., 2002), echo-state networks (Jaeger, 2001; Jaeger and Haas, 2004), and related formalisms 
(Sussillo and Abbott, 2009), includes recurrence (like RNNs) but the learning component is 
only present in the read-out, or output, layer (Figure 10A). Because of the feedback connections 
in the reservoir, the architecture has memory properties, that is, its state depends on the 
current input and past reservoir states. The read-out stage can be one of many simple 
classifiers, including linear discrimination or logistic regression, thus providing considerable 
flexibility to the framework. Intuitively, reservoir computing is capable of separating complex 
stimuli because the reservoir projects the input onto a higher-dimensional space, making it 
easier to classify them. Of course, this is related to the well-known difficulty of attaining 
separability in low dimensions, as recognized early on with the use of perceptrons. 
Very briefly, the state of the reservoir can be determined as follows: 
?̃?(𝑡) = 𝑓 (𝑾i𝒖(𝑡) + 𝑾𝒙(𝑡 − 1)), 
𝒙(𝑡) = (1 − 𝛼)𝒙(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛼?̃?(𝑡), 
where ?̃? is an intermediate state and 𝒙 is the state of the reservoir with dimensionality 𝜏𝑁, 
where 𝜏 is a parameter and 𝑁 is the number of input units; 𝒖 specifies the input to the system 
(augmented with a standard bias term of 1). The function 𝑓 is a sigmoidal function, and 𝛼 is the 
forgetting rate parameter. The matrix 𝑾i is the input-to-reservoir matrix and the matrix 𝑾 
specifies the within-reservoir weights, both of which are generated randomly, that is, they are 
not learned. For more details, see (Jaeger and Haas, 2004; Lukosevicius, 2012). 
A central objective of our study was to investigate reservoir computing for the purposes 
of classifying fMRI data, in particular when temporal structure might be relevant, including 
both task data and data acquired during movie watching. The latter illustrates the potential of 
the technique for the analysis of naturalistic conditions, which are an increasing focus of 
research. One of the conditions we investigated was the so-called “theory of mind” task9. 
Participants watched 20-second clips containing simple geometrical objects (including squares, 
rectangles, triangles, and circles) that engaged in a potential socially relevant interaction (such 
as appeareing to initially fight and then make up) that unfolded throughout the duration of the 
clip. When watching such clips, one has the impression that the potential meaning of the 
                                                          
9 From the Human Connectome Project. 
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interactions gradually becomes clearer and evolves during the clip. The control condition 
consisted of same-duration clips using the same geometrical objects following random motion. 
Could the network classify theory of mind versus random clips, and in what manner was that 
related to temporal information? 
Two key parameters determine the memory properties of the reservoir: the forgetting 
rate, 𝛼, the and ratio of the number of reservoir-to-input units, 𝜏. Classification accuracy 
increased as the size of the reservoir increased, and exceeded 85% (which robustly differed from 
chance levels). We also trained the classifier by randomzing temporal information, namely, by 
randomly shuffling the data points in a block prior to training, and testing on unperturbed 
blocks (that is, temporally ordered). In this case, mean classification accuracy was drastically 
reduced to 56% correct. These and other control analyses indicated that reservoir networks 
were able to capture some of the temporal dynamics measured by functional MRI. 
We also sought to determine the dimensionality 
of the reservoir representation capable of classifying 
task conditions. The original dimensionality of our data 
was 360, which corresponded to the number of brain 
regions of interest investigated. As the goal was task 
classification, we selected dimensions that would 
contribute the most discriminative information in this 
regard (Figure 10B). Therefore, we performed PCA on 
reservoir data (that is, activation of the reservoir layer), 
and ordered the components based on their 
contributions to classification (somewhat akin to partial 
least squares), instead of the variance explained. Figure 
11 shows classification accuracy as the number of 
components was increased from 2 to 20 in steps of two. Remarkably, only ten principal 
components were required to attain classification at 95% of the level of the full dimensionality 
of the data. It is noteworthy that these components captured only 7% of the total variance, 
which should be compared to 70% if one selected components based on the amount of variance 
explained. Thus, only a small percentage of the original signal variance was informative for 
classification. 
Figure 11. Lower-dimensional representation 
of reservoir signals and classification accuracy. 
Accuracy is shown as a function of the 
number of dimensions. The magenta line 
indicates the performance using all 
dimensions. Classification accuracy reached 
within 95% of the full data with 12 
dimensions. 
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Using just the top 
three classification-related 
components allowed good 
accuracy, as shown in 
Figure 10A where 
performance is plotted as a 
function of time. Accuracy 
was initially around 
chance, and increased 
considerably between time 
points ~4 to ~8 seconds, 
eventually surpassing 
around 80% correct. In terms of the top three dimensions, the trajectories of the social and 
random conditions initially overlapped, but later became quite distinct (Figure 12B).  
 
10. Conclusions for a science of emotion and cognition 
Neuroscience strives to elucidate the neural underpinnings of interesting behaviors. Modern 
neuroscience has done so in a preponderantly reductionistic fashion for over a century and a 
half10. I would venture that progress has been stymied by such approach and that the time is 
ripe for the field to phase-transition into a period when Grossbergian themes come to the fore. 
By embracing head on the leitmotifs of dynamics, decentralized computation, emergence, 
selection and competition, and autonomy, a science of the mind-brain can be developed that is 
built upon a solid foundation of understanding behavior while employing computational and 
mathematical tools in an integral manner. 
At a time when the development of neurotechniques has attained a fever pitch, 
neuroscience needs to take stock and invest comparable energy in the conceptual and 
theoretical sides. Otherwise we run the risk of being able to measure every atom in the brain in 
a theoretical vacuum. Suppose, for that matter, that experimental physicists could measure 
every atom of a given galaxy. How would that advance understanding if not for a theory of 
                                                          
10 We can arbitrarily consider “modern neuroscience” to start with Broca’s 1861 clinical report (Broca, 1861). 
Figure 12. Classification accuracy and neural trajectories. (A) Classification 
accuracy as a function of time during the viewing of “social” and “random” 
clips. (B) The mean trajectories for the two experimental conditions 
overlapped considerably during the initial period, but separated well with time.  
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gravitation that took more than 400 years of development? The current obsession in the field 
with causation is equally problematic. Without theory, “causal” explanations add little to 
current understanding. 
Ultimately, to explain the cognitive-emotional brain, we need to dissolve boundaries 
within the brain – perception, cognition, action, etc. – as well as outside the brain, as we bring 
down the walls between biology, ecology, mathematics, computer science, philosophy, and so 
on11. Let’s hope that the body of work by Steve Grossberg can inspire us all in this formidable 
endeavor. 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Fear extinction and structure-function mapping. (A) Fear extinction. (B) 
Conceptualization of fear extinction in terms of the top-down regulation of the amygdala by the 
medial prefrontal cortex, with additional variables influencing the process. (C) Schematic 
representation of the connections between some of the brain regions involved, emphasizing a 
non-hierarchical view of the processes leading to fear extinction. The descriptors “valence,” 
“regulation,” and so on, are not tied to brain areas in any straightforward one-to-one fashion. 
Abbreviations: CS, conditioned stimulus; MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; OFC, orbitofrontal 
cortex. 
 
Figure 2. The three-body problem in Newtonian gravitation. As the problem does not admit to 
a general mathematical solution, researchers have sought to characterize families of periodic 
orbits. The figure displays the “yin-yan II” family in two dimensions. The three circles 
represent the three bodies. Reproduced from Li and Liao (2017). Dynamic plots can be found at 
http://numericaltank.sjtu.edu.cn/three-body/three-body.htm.  
 
Figure 3. Neural trajectories. Trajectories represent the activation state of the system at every 
point in time. (A) Recordings were performed in 87 principal neurons (PNs) of the antennal 
lobe of the locust during exposure to two odors (citral: cit; geraniol: ger) (Broome et al., 2006). 
Local linear embedding (LLE) was employed to reduce the dimensionality of the data. (B) 
Recordings were performed in premotor and motor cortex during reaching movements in the 
macaque monkey (Churchland et al., 2012). A principal components analysis-based algorithm 
was used to determine the two-dimensional representation displayed. Individual trials are 
represented by trajectories colored based on the extent of preparatory/pre-movement activity 
(from red to green). 
 
Figure 4. Neural trajectories during threat processing. (A) Evoked responses when 
transitioning from safe (green) to threat (red), and vice versa. 𝑥1and 𝑥2 represent the activity of 
two brain regions. (B) The responses can be jointly plotted as a function of time, (𝑥1(𝑡), 𝑥2(𝑡)), 
to show safe and threat trajectories. The two dots in panel A correspond to the ones here 
(schematically only). (C) Trajectories for safe and threat conditions when evokes responses are 
comparable but they are more correlated during threat. (D) Corresponding to panel D, we can 
think of the trajectories for threat and safe as evolving through cylinders of different diameters 
(which correspond to the trajectory variance). (E) Individual differences in anxiety can be 
understood as shifting the trajectories from safe to threat. 
 
Figure 5. Temporal trajectories based on functional MRI data. The original data were from safe 
and threat periods in the study by McMenamin et al. (2014). Trajectories for safe and threat 
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conditions are fairly distinct in the lower-dimensional space determined by local linear 
embedding. (A) Mean trajectories across individuals. The colored circles indicate the starting 
point. (B) Surfaces provide an indication of the underlying space of trajectories, or manifold, 
and were created by considering the variance of the trajectories across individuals. 
  
Figure 6. Trajectory manifolds. A manifold is a surface (more precisely a topological space) that 
near each point (that is, locally) resembles Euclidean space (circles and spheres are some of the 
simplest manifolds in two- and three dimensions). A non-Euclidean (Riemannian) metric on a 
manifold allows distances and angles to be measured. (A) Example manifold. The neural-
dynamics space working hypothesis suggests that system behaviors can be characterized via 
classes of trajectories within neural spaces with particular geometry – that is, manifolds. (B, C) 
Neural manifolds associated with transient dynamics are, by definition, non-periodic. Here, 
“population” indicates that the manifold is a group-level property. Two inter-related problems 
can be posed. One is estimating the group-level trajectory (red) from sample data (trajectories 
in orange); the other is learning the population manifold (green) from sample-level trajectories 
(orange). 
 
Figure 7. Geometry of the neural space. The activity of brain areas 1-3 can be mapped onto 
distinct properties believed to reflect their function, including univariate properties and 
multivariate/network-level properties. Here, a hypothetical trajectory is illustrated during a 
dynamic threat scenario in which threat level gradually increases (red) and then decreases 
(green).  
 
Figure 8. Trajectories during threat processing. Threat-level varies dynamically and increases 
(approach) and decreases (retreat). The temporal evolution of the system can be described in 
terms of the global efficiency of the salience network, the activation (evoked responses) in the 
same network, as well as the centrality of the amygdala/bed nucleus of the stria terminalis 
regions. 
 
Figure 9. Dispositional negativity. Participants perform a cognitive challenging task for an 
extended period of time. In one condition, there is a lower level of background threat, whereas a 
higher level is present in the second; the latter is anticipated to impair performance to a greater 
extent. Hypothetical neural trajectories are shown for the two conditions: the two trajectories 
will reside in separate sectors of state space, with the separation between them depending on an 
individual’s level of dispositional negativity.  
 
Figure 10. Reservoir computing and dimensionality reduction. (A) Brain data are provided to a 
three-layer neural network. The input layer registers activation at time t across a set of regions 
of interest. The reservoir layer contains units with random connections, and provides a 
33 
 
memory mechanism such that activation at time t is influenced by past time points. The readout 
(output) layer indicates the category of the input, such as the binary labels “0” or “1” 
corresponding to task condition. Only the connections between the reservoir and the readout 
layer (shown in orange) are adaptable. (B) The first step of dimensionality reduction employed 
principal components analysis of the reservoir states. Subsequently, the dimensions were 
ordered based on classification information (such as the weights of a logistic regression 
classifier). If the top three dimensions are selected, the evolution of the reservoir can be plotted 
in this lower-dimensional space. In the present case, the trajectories originated from functional 
MRI data during the viewing of short movie clips, which were either “scary” or “funny” 
(Venkatesh et al., 2019). In the example, the trajectories separated quite well. 
 
Figure 11. Lower-dimensional representation of reservoir signals and classification accuracy. 
Accuracy is shown as a function of the number of dimensions. The magenta line indicates the 
performance using all dimensions. Classification accuracy reached within 95% of the full data 
with 12 dimensions. 
 
Figure 12. Classification accuracy and neural trajectories. (A) Classification accuracy as a 
function of time during the viewing of “social” and “random” clips. (B) The mean trajectories for 
the two experimental conditions overlapped considerably during the initial period, but 
separated well with time.  
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